

Pepsi Case Study

Organizational Change and Development

Becky Arnold, Anny Currin, Kim Pontano &

Sara Richards

Prof. Dyer-Gear

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Gary Rodkin came aboard the Pepsi Cola North America (PCNA) Team knowing he would face many challenges. Just how difficult these challenges would be to overcome, nobody could predict. Rodkin came to PepsiCo. on the heels of internal strife, including a Pepsi ONE brand that was failing despite an extensive supporting advertising campaign. One of the major reasons Pepsi ONE failed was because bottlers had lost interest in selling it (Thomas, Carriogia, and Kanji, 2003). What Rodkin could not have known at the point of his hiring was that this ambivalence was a symptom of many other issues plaguing the company.

Rodkin started working for PepsiCo. after the unexpected resignation of Phil Marineau. Rodkin was given one week to decide if he wanted the job, after meeting with PepsiCo. President/CEO, Roger Enrico. Although Rodkin lacked experience in the bottling industry, he felt that he would be able to adequately do the job; however, not everyone agreed with him. Many had concerns that Rodkin would not be able to assert himself in his new leadership role and many employees were already discontent with both their jobs and with the senior team, mainly due to a huge disconnect in communication (Thomas, et al., 2003). One employee stated, "Everyone was concerned because Gary came in from outside the soft drink and bottling business" (Thomas et al., p.11). Without the support of the other executives and confidence from his employees, Rodkin was behind without even doing anything.

The concerns were not completely one-sided. Rodkin himself had concerns about the company's senior leaders, specifically whether members of the company who had been there for many years would prove themselves capable of separating themselves from old ways and move into the future. Rodkin faced the challenge of deciding whether it

would be beneficial to bring in new people or to try to shape veteran leaders to fit his goals for the company (Thomas et al., 2003).

Another problem was that Rodkin was no more familiar with his senior members than they were with him. He had the task of keeping a division afloat without even knowing with whom he was working (Thomas et al., 2003). Compounding this issue was a sense of confusion about what the senior team's goals should be and what Rodkin's mission was for the division as a whole. These matters, in addition to the failing Pepsi ONE brand, were some of the main causes for PCNA having its lowest sales numbers in many years.

The complex organization of PepsiCo. made an analysis of the company difficult, especially for an incoming executive such as Rodkin. Rodkin himself stated that, "It's unusual for someone to come into the soft drink business at a very senior level because of the organizational complexity" (Thomas et al., 2003, p.1). Right away, Rodkin observed several areas needing to be immediately fixed. For one, Rodkin knew that there was very little time for changes to happen. Rodkin stated, "...I knew that I didn't have a lot of time to fix things or we were going to slip into another really bad year. The sense of urgency was very, very high" (Thomas et al., p.1). Rodkin set his timeline to align with the annual operating plan meeting, which was scheduled for August of 2000. At this meeting, the company would set its strategies and performance targets. If PCNA was not in shape by then, Rodkin felt it would face "another year of flat sales growth" (Thomas et al., p.2). This timeline was a tough goal, but one that Rodkin was determined to meet.

Other general issues jumped out at Rodkin right away, including a low employee morale and confusion among all levels of employees regarding PCNA's vision and

mission. There also seemed to be a lack of confidence on all sides (Thomas et al., 2003). PCNA was a newly formed sector of PepsiCo. and had pressure from stock holders to be successful. PCNA also greatly impacted PepsiCo.'s visibility as a whole, compounding the pressure upon Rodkin to be successful (Thomas, et al.). Near the time Rodkin came to Pepsi, Coca-Cola Co. (Coke), PepsiCo.'s largest competitor, was having its own internal problems. Therefore, Rodkin needed to capitalize on Coke's weakness by growing product volume, cultivating alliances with companies for national accounts, and introducing successful, new products (Thomas, et al.).

The relationships between Rodkin and the senior members and the relationship between senior members and other employees were not the only ones that needed mending. There was also tension between bottlers and retailers, as well as between bottlers and PCNA employees. Bottling originated within small, local operations, allowing closely-knit relationships with retailers. The growth of the company, as well as increased pressure to make sales, caused a breakdown in any personal connections (Thomas et al., 2003).

801 Over time, issues arose between the high-ranking marketing and sales managers at Pepsi and the "grease-under-the-fingernails" bottlers. Managers wanted more sales volume while the bottlers wanted to make the most net profit (Thomas et al., 2003). The key to working out this relationship was a position known as the "Franchise Manager."

Anyone working in this position had to be strong because he/she would be the link for PCNA to the bottlers. Franchise Managers helped to support the bottlers with incentives and local funding, while also promoting Pepsi and attempting to increase sales volume (Thomas et al., 2003). Franchise Managers were eliminated by Rodkin's

predecessor during restructuring, creating a huge lapse in communication. Without Franchise Managers, PCNA employees were unable to get what they needed from the bottlers, who now had more control over their own operations. The relationship between the bottlers and the retailers, as well as PCNA employees, was extremely important and one of Rodkin's most important missions would be to mend these vital relationships.

In the 1980s, PepsiCo. began to acquire bottling franchises instead of trying to entice bottlers to package certain products. The contracts with outside bottlers had not previously required them to bottle new Pepsi beverages. This fact made it difficult to get bottlers to participate and distribute new products to consumers due to the high costs of bottling new products (Thomas et al., 2003). In direct contrast was the fact that Pepsi hoped to increase market shares and create a larger return for investors through these new products (Thomas et al.).

PepsiCo. faced a culture shift when Pepsi began to focus more on executing bottling operations than developing strategies to sell brands. By 1998, the company owned 54 percent of its U.S. distribution, with the next highest bottler controlling 20 percent (Thomas et al., 2003). This shift was the opposite of Coke, which started decentralizing and was beating Pepsi in both domestic market share and in the stock market during the 1990s (Thomas et al.). These are the main reason Marineau began to make changes in 1997. The biggest change was the creation of the Pepsi Bottling Group (PBG). PBG was to be an independent, publicly held corporation in which PepsiCo. maintained 40 percent ownership. The PCNA division would now solely focus on marketing, sales, and drink concentrate (Thomas et al.). The main reasons executives chose to make this split were to create PBG as a separate Wall Street value, to use PBG's

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capital to help with other acquisitions, and to allow PCNA to focus on building Pepsi brands (Thomas et al.). Marineau retained control of PCNA and another Pepsi Executive, Craig Weatherup, retained control of PBG. Weatherup was almost immediately able to get PBG organized and ready while Marineau often needed help from the VP of Human Resources (Thomas et al.).

As Rodkin's predecessor, Phil Marineau came in as CEO of PepsiCo.; he had no experience working with franchise systems. Marineau decided to make a huge change as head of the new PCNA division, creating the "Hangar Group," to determine how to structure PCNA after the split. The people involved, all with different amounts of experience and responsibilities, defined PCNA's mission, goals, and determined how it should be structured. The group organized PCNA around customers and not for the convenience of bottlers. It even went as far as to eliminate the very important Franchise Manager position. PCNA used geographical locations of large retailers, such as Wal-Mart, to divide into Customer Marketing Territories (CMTs). The CMT Managers worked with retail customers in their areas and were also supposed to work with bottlers that distributed in their territories (Thomas et al., 2003). Removing the Franchise Manager position, and failing to take into account the needs of bottlers, would prove to be a major future issue that Rodkin would have to take on.

The "Hangar Group" had based its goals and mission assuming PBG and PCNA would work together in a partnership toward the goal of "increasing sales volume and developing PepsiCo.'s portfolio of trademarks" (Thomas et al., 2003, p. 6). The problem, as previously mentioned, was that bottlers were focused on profits rather than sales volume. Although assumed to be the same, the main goal of each division contained

significant differences. A few months after the split, one executive stated, "Bottlers are more margin-focused and PCNA is more volume-focused. We will never see everything exactly eye to eye" (Thomas et al., p.7). It was clear that PBG and PCNA were not working with the sort of synergy for which executives had hoped.

Employees complained about the new system and the CMT managers were having trouble getting bottlers to comply with their arranged deals with retailers. In some territories, PBG had more leverage than CMT managers because PBG owned 80-100 percent of the region's distribution. Also, PBG did not have to focus just on Pepsi, whereas Pepsi relied on PBG (Thomas et al., 2003). Although neither PBG nor PCNA could survive without the other, the duties of each were unclear and often both divisions tried to do the same thing at the same time. This only increased animosity between PBG and PCNA. CMTs were losing the guarantee that they tried to sell retailers because the bottlers were not sticking to PCNA's plan. Also, the CMT managers felt "powerless" and felt that without the Franchise Managers, they had no support (Thomas et al.).

By May 1999, it was clear the system needed to change. Many of the veterans in power were convinced that over time the system would work itself out, but Rodkin disagreed. Rodkin came on-board during September of that year. At that time, bottlers complained that they could not communicate with PCNA effectively and, without the Franchise Managers, they felt ignored. On the other hand, PCNA employees felt that their efforts were not being supported by PBG (Thomas et al., 2003). PCNA and PBG needed to work as a team instead of moving further apart. This would be Rodkin's greatest challenge.

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Immediately, Rodkin received feedback from sources confirming that troubles were occurring. One employee stated, "As a concentrate company, we don't know what we stand for. There is a feeling that we are subservient and submissive to our largest bottler, PBG...If we stay with this path, the good people will leave" (Thomas et al., 2003, p.10-11). Rodkin's initial reaction was pretty similar to that of the employees. Rodkin stated:

It was a terrible relationship between the two companies...There was a complete lack of trust, and as a result, there was no alignment of strategies and no feeling of partnership with the company that was responsible for more than half of our product distribution (Thomas et al., 11).

PCNA not only had issues with PBG, but it also had issues within itself. PCNA employees and senior team members were having difficulty communicating. Many employees were not clear about the division's mission, goals, and vision. Also, one employee complained that "Pepsi does not value people who speak their minds...There are lots of people with vast Pepsi experience who have been ignored since the organization split" (Thomas et al., 2003, p.11). Rodkin not only needed to work on these internal issues, but he needed to get support for himself within PCNA.

After only being there a few weeks, he realized he faced a lapse in quality control of Mountain Dew, Pepsi's fastest growing soft drink. Rodkin also realized he had no idea who was supposed to help him improve this issue. The company was so disorganized that it was unclear to its CEO who was supposed to do what (Thomas et al., 2003). PCNA would never be able to successfully work with PBG, if it did not have itself together first. Although Rodkin had concerns about whether senior leaders would be able to move on

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past the issues with PBG, their experience at Pepsi was vitally important. Rodkin faced an important decision, namely whether experience was more valuable than a fresh, unbiased perspective (Thomas et al.).

Gary Rodkin stepped into one of the most challenging business roles anyone has assumed. He had experience, but not the specific type one would link with working for PepsiCo. Not only did Rodkin have to deal with competing companies like Coke, a time crunch, and huge amounts of internal pressure, he also had to deal with potentially devastating issues within his own division. Rodkin had to overcome his status as an outsider with no experience, in order to deal with executives who had years of experience and significant clout within PepsiCo. He also needed to accomplish all of these things without the VP of Human Resources, who left just after he started. Rodkin did his best to keep the goals he set because he knew that if he could get PCNA back on track before Coke could resolve its internal issues, he would be successful.

In order to understand the problems that the company faces one must look at the root causes of the problem. There are several key events and issues that began to cause problems for PCNA, and those events were Phil Marineau's lack of industry experience, the reorganization process, PCNA's structure, and communication problems.

Phil Marineau joined Pepsi-Cola Company in December 1997 as its CEO. Marineau was described as a charismatic leader with strong opinions, broad creative ideas, and 20 years of brand-building experience in the food industry, "he had limited experience working with the soft drink industry's franchise system" (Thomas et al., 2003, p. 5). Marineau's counterpart, Craig Weatherup, had extensive experience with the Pepsi-Cola Company, and "had its organization in order almost immediately after the

separation, due in part to the analytical rigor” (Thomas et al., p. 5). Marineau’s inexperience was a root problem because he lacked industry knowledge and the analytic skills to effectively run his division especially compared to Weatherup.

The second basic problem that PCNA faced was its reorganization process, a task completed in secret by Marineau, a team of 10 executives from PCNA, the VP of Human Resources, and an outside consultant. The group had a wide range of experience working for Pepsi, ranging from one to twenty one years. The team was referred to as the ‘Hangar Group,’ because they met secretly in a hangar at the local airport (Thomas et al., 2003, p. 5). During the hangar meetings, Marineau purposefully left out senior executives from attending the meetings to prevent them from designing their own departments and jobs. This was not a wise decision for Marineau because he potentially omitted the opinions of employees with very valuable experience, while also constructing an aura of secrecy that undermines morale.

Robbins (2005) explains that practicing openness is a key factor in building trust with employees, and that managers “need to make certain the criteria on how decisions are made overly clear, explain the rationale for your decisions, be candid about problems, and fully disclose relevant information.” (p. 174) Based upon the way that the meeting was structured, and the fact that it was secret, was not a good way to build trust for the employees of PCNA. This approach to Pepsi’s reorganization undoubtedly resulted in future problems for PCNA.

After the Hangar Group decided its mission, goals, and operating principles the group determined its new structure. One of the main changes that took place was eliminating the Franchise Manager role. This role was “a popular and historically rooted

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sales support resource to the franchise bottler.” (Thomas et al., 2003, p. 6) Instead of the Franchise Managers, the United States was divided into four territories called Customer Marketing Territories (CMTs) and each was run by a director. The director had many duties including approaching large retail customers, negotiating sales programs, including delivery volume, delivery date, and price structure (Thomas et al., p. 6). This structural change hit at the heart of the organization for PCNA.

The Hangar Group envisioned that PNCA and PBG “would be a dynamic partnership... on the assumption that increased sales volume benefited both PNCA and its franchise bottlers” (Thomas et al. 2003, p. 6). Essentially PNCA and PBG both believed that their job was to negotiate sales programs with retailers; they could not work together and seemed to be getting in each other’s way. But, “in reality neither PNCA nor PBG could satisfy the customer alone” (Thomas et al., p. 7). While PNCA and PBG needed to work together to please customers the structures of both did not allow that to happen.

Essentially PCNA and the bottlers were focusing on two different outcomes. There was also a struggle of power for PCNA:

PBG CEO Craig Weatherup had successfully negotiated with PepsiCo CEO

Roger Enrico that all of PBG’s incentive funding go directly to PBG headquarter rather than through PCNA to the field, a major source of the CMT’s directors’ power was removed (Thomas et al., 2003, p. 7).

This lack of power and funding affected the PCNA workers and was a root problem for PCNA. One CMT used words like “powerless,” “a third wheel in the machinery,” and “it was a struggle,” to describe his position in the company (Thomas et al., p. 8).

Another main problem with PCNA stemming from issues of leadership, the Hangar Group, and the structure was a breakdown in communication. The lack of communication hindered team work and prevented the division from completing key tasks. “In several instances it failed to secure prime space agreements with major retailer customers due to its inability to coordinate with its large bottlers” (Thomas et al., 2003, p. 8). As an example, during the 1999 Fourth of July holiday, PCNA failed to gain exclusive ad space and lost a major sales opportunity.

At the root of the Pepsi’s problems when Gary Rodkin took over PCNA was the dissatisfaction of the company’s employees. In general, the employees did not know what they stood for, and they had negative feelings toward PBG. The employees did not have faith in their senior executive team and felt that they, “lacked strategic direction and vision, and was disconnected from the employees at PCNA (Thomas et al., 2003, p. 11). The capabilities of the senior executives were also a serious problem with which Rodkin had to cope.

One method for diagnosing organizations is the 7-S Model developed by Tom Peters and Robert Waterman (Peters & Waterman, 2004). The 7-S Model bases its theories on the assumption there are seven elements of an organization, and the more aligned each element is with one another, the more effective the organization will be. The seven elements are Strategy, Structure, Systems, Staffing, Skills, Style and Shared values (Peters & Waterman). To see how well PCNA is aligned, it is necessary to first look at each element separately.

The Strategy element looks at how a company plans to differentiate itself from the rest of the market. At the time of Rodkin’s entrance “...PCNA’s primary competitor

Coca-Cola Co., was grappling with internal problems, which created a strategic opportunity for PCNA to gain market share by growing core product volume, forging strategic alliances with national customer accounts, and introducing new products” (Thomas et al., 2003, p. 1). Additionally, since PCNA’s main goal was to sell concentrate its bottom line was focused primarily on sales volume. Also, in direct contrast to Coca-Cola Co., Pepsi made the business decision to acquire bottling franchises. “Company leaders believed that operational control over a large part of their bottling and distribution system would give them an advantage over Coca-Cola in the long term.” (Thomas et al, p. 4).

A look at PCNA’s structure reveals that in the months prior to Rodkin joining PCNA, its parent company, PepsiCo., had undergone a major restructuring. The two main functions, branding and bottling, were spun off into separate divisions and each division was allowed to structure itself in whatever manner best suited its operations. PCNA’s intent was to go from a “functional orientation to plans and initiatives” to an “integrated, cross-functional approach to the business” (Thomas et al, 2003, p.14). The sales department went from an orientation where the market was driven by bottler ownership to one where the market was driven by the customer. Consequently, the organization became “bottler indifferent”. Finally, rather than nationally driven marketing campaigns, marketing would now be determined based upon local needs (Thomas et al.). In order to support this new paradigm, PCNA structured itself in a decentralized functional capacity.

In reviewing a company’s Systems, the processes and procedures used are examined. After the reorganization by the Hangar Group, PCNA implemented several

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new systems to support its business strategies. Incentive programs were used to entice customers into buying Pepsi products and new customer support positions, CMTs, were created in the sales department to support PCNA's new structure (Thomas et al, 2003).

Systems were also in place to capitalize on prime holidays such as the Fourth of July and the entrance of new products. While PCNA's systems appeared to be aligned with the other "S" elements, they did not work effectively when partnered with PBG's business systems.

Staffing was an element which Rodkin was practically concerned. He was unfamiliar with his own senior management team and, by his own admission, faced a steep learning curve himself (Thomas et al, 2003). The soft drink industry is very complex organizational due to the bottler component (Thomas et al.). Moreover, the results of the recent employee survey showed very low morale coupled with serious trust issues with senior management.

The sixth element is Skills. This element is concerned with the knowledge set necessary for the company to succeed. What competencies make the company successful? At PCNA, knowledge about the soft drink industry was crucial. In the aftermath of the split with PBG, an additional skill set also became necessary. "The kinds of skills it takes to run a highly efficient, highly capital-intensive bottling organization are different from the skills it takes to build and develop brands and create consumer demand" (Thomas et al, 2003, p. 5). If a company is unsure of the skill set required to flourish, it can never be properly aligned with the staffing element.

The last element remaining is Shared Values, a concept that deals with the company culture and belief system. Company vision and mission statements fall under

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this category. While PCNA had a formal mission statement, results of the employee survey showed it was not enough to bond employees together. As previously noted, some employees simply did not immediately know upon what principles the company was acting and what the company stood for. When the Hangar Group was initially defining PCNA's mission and operating principles, it did acted on the flawed assumption "that increased sales volume benefited both PCNA and its franchise bottlers" (Thomas et al, 2003, p. 6).

PCNA's weakest elements were Skills, Shared Values, and Systems. With the incorrect assumption that both PCNA and the bottlers would benefit from increased sales volume, PCNA was unable to create a solid foundation with which to link the "7-S" elements. While many of the elements could be considered to be in alignment with each other, they were misaligned on whole with the business environment around them. While PCNA had systems set up to capitalize on summer holidays or maintain momentum for new products, those systems were in conflict with the environment and were not effective.

Rodkin had a game plan for rebuilding PCNA. This plan revolved around four main objectives:

- 1) Create a strong leadership team
- 2) Create a common vision for PCNA
- 3) Present a unified front to all the stakeholders with PBG
- 4) Strengthen the product development and marketing departments for company growth.

It was imperative that Rodkin surround himself with a strong leadership team. The management structure developed by 'The Hangar Club' was not successful. Components of the team were not appropriate for the company and other necessary departments such as Human Resources, were not led by the right people.

The first major objective was to re-establish a proper organizational structure. Rodkin must hire from the outside or promote from within those people who will work with him for the common goal. It was important to find people with the drive and expertise to focus on finances, product development, marketing and Human Resources. It would be very helpful if the HR specialist had a background in Organizational Change and Development as there was much work to be done with the staff and the organization in general. Rodkin also needed to find someone who was familiar with the beverage industry and could give him strong technical help.

Once the operational team was in place, a clear Mission Statement or Vision for the company had to be developed.

A vision describes the core values and purpose that guide the organization as well as an envisioned future toward which change is directed. It provides a valued direction for designing, implementing and assessing organizational changes. The vision also can energize commitment to change by providing members with a common goal and a compelling rationale for why change is necessary and worth the effort (Cummings & Worley, 2005. p. 161).

Since changes to the strategic plan needed to be made in order to bring the company out of its slump, a clear, well-communicated vision was paramount. The vision needed to be developed with input from the new leadership team as well as

representatives from the various stakeholder groups. Agreement on the basic vision was necessary for managers to communicate the vision to the employees and all other stakeholders. Once everyone knew the goal, they could more easily and clearly work towards making it happen. Employees needed to know their role in the plan in order to give their support. This knowledge would address the low morale issues.

Communication could not stop with employees of PCNA. A cooperative effort between PCNA and PBG was crucial in order for Pepsi Co. to become one of the top beverage companies in the twenty first century. Open communication between Rodkin and Weatherup was a must to have a successful joint venture. Support from Weatherup was necessary in order for the community to see that they were working as a united team. Meetings with bottlers, venture capitalists and distributors would be done together as it was important to show the bottlers and retailers the advantages of working with the Pepsi Corporation as a whole. Aligning operations between PCNA and PBG would gather stakeholder support and build confidence in the financial backers. This support was crucial to the strategic plan as growth could only come from the development of new products. Research and development takes money which was not readily available in the company's present condition. Buy-in for the plan from potential investors was a key component to success. New products would help the company diversify and capture more of the market. Communication with Roger Enrico was also necessary to show that the company was presenting a united front.

The last piece of the reconstruction plan was a strong marketing department. This department needed to focus on introducing the new product lines as well as re-kindling a desire for the tried and true products.

A review of the current literature tells us that the decisions taken by Rodkin early in his career at PCNA worked very well. After a re-alignment of the divisions in 2003, Rodkin said “We will present one face to our biggest retail customers and with the marketplace constantly moving in new directions, we’ll be able to do more than just react to the latest trend. We’ll move faster and lead category growth” (BI, 2003). Since 1999 PCNA has launched at least 12 new products. Under Rodkin’s leadership, Pepsi took an active role in the “non-alcoholic beverages such as juices, water, coffee, sports drinks, teas and alternative beverages...” (Chura, 2002). Working closely with the product development department, Rodkin says: “Marketing is keeping pace while others retrench, Pepsi is increasing media spending” (Chura, 2002). Applying his passion for sports, Rodkin and his marketing staff partnered PepsiCo with both Major League Football and Major League Baseball for endorsements of their products. They have also sponsored big events such as the Super Bowl and partnered with other celebrities for endorsement.

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Further bolstering the successful nature of Rodkin’s leadership, in 2005 Wall Street suggested that “new (2005) products are keeping consumers coming back for more” (BI, 2003). It is apparent that even though Rodkin was new to the beverage industry upon assuming his duties, he was a man who listened to his stakeholders, worked well under time constraints, fostered communications with partners, and successfully navigated the many potential pitfalls in the implementation of his plan. His successes portrays someone that is not only “in tune” with his business and his market, but also an executive that values human relationships, specifically the ability of those relationships to achieve greater heights for PCNA.

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Statement of Work: Pepsi Case Study

Becky Arnold, Anny Currin, Kim Pontano & Sara Richards

Becky: Question Two, group meetings (edit power point, etc), reference list compilation

Signature: Becky Arnold

Anny: Question Four, group meetings (edit power point, etc)

Signature: Anny Currin

Kim: Question One, Power point presentation, group meetings (edit power point, etc)

Signature: Kim Pontano

Sara: Question Three, final compilation, group meetings (edit power point, etc)

Signature: Sara Richards